, Bacilus cereus was recovered from 24 of 5,534 (0.49%) blood cultures and 22 of 1,088 (2.02%) other body fluid cultures. The rarity of this organism as a pathogen and comparison with previous baseline rates led to the conclusion that it was a pseudoepidemic involving some form of culture contamination. Generalized precautions taken without specific knowledge of the contaminant source reduced the recovery rate of the organism. Recovery rates for the organism returned to normal baseline prevalence after environmental cultures and epidemiological analysis led to the sterilization of a contaminated water bath used for boiling thioglycollate media. The problems encountered in this investigation are examined, and a systematic approach to clinical laboratory epidemiology is outlined. 
Pseudoinfections caused by contaminated cultures are a grudgingly accepted occurrence of modern medicine and clinical microbiology (5) . Laboratory standards are established to keep this problem to a minimum. Even under ideal conditions, contamination from skin, air, or reagents used in processing may occur. Because of the expanding list of organisms that can be considered pathogens in various patient populations, such contamination can cause misdiagnosis and require unnecessary or improper treatment as a precaution until a repeat culture can be performed (10) . The clinical microbiologist at times may be called upon to help distinguish between contamination and true infections. Because of the laboratory's limited clinical perspective and the subjectivity involved in such a determination, the microbiologist should exercise considerable caution in such cases, remembering that the final decision is the physician's responsibility.
When an organism is isolated above the normal baseline rate, it is incumbent upon laboratory personnel, with the aid of attending physicians, to determine if the unusual rate is due to laboratory contamination or true infection. A recurrent source of contamination may appear as a nosocomial epidemic. One study by the Centers for Disease Control determined that 11% of all nosocomial outbreaks were in fact pseudoepidemics (10) . Recognizing and tracking the source of such outbreaks can be a difficult task (5) . Standard epidemiological techniques do not always translate properly to the clinical laboratory setting. Using an investigation of a recent pseudoepidemic due to contaminated blood cultures in our laboratory, we examine problems that often arise in such investigations and outline a more systematic approach.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Specimen collection and processing. Blood cultures were collected by house officers using the Du Pont Isolator culture tube. Blood samples received in the laboratory were centrifuged for 30 min and processed within a biological safety cabinet. During the initial setup, the supernatant fluid was withdrawn aseptically from the Isolator tube and the remaining sediment was inoculated onto Columbia 5% sheep blood * Corresponding author. on the organism showed uniform resistance to ampicillin (>2.0), oxacillin (>4.0), penicillin G (>2.0), and trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole (>2 and 78). It should be noted that monthly statistical control charts tracking Bacillus isolates from blood cultures did not exceed limits until data were compiled for April (Fig. 1) . While B. cereus has been reported as a blood-borne pathogen in rare cases (1, 7) , it is generally considered an airborne contaminant (11) . Examinations of the patietits' clinical statuses through consultations with attending physicians suggested contamination rather than true sepsis with this organism. Subsequently, the outbreak was investigated as a possible laboratory contamination problem.
Early attempts to determine a point source for the contamination involved the incubation of uninoculated culture media and compilation of patient and culture historical data. The number of contaminated cultures was tracked graphically by collection date (Fig. 2) , providing a historical perspective of the problem. From culture data, it was immediately apparent that all contaminants were recovered from either the SP bottle used in blood cultures (the organism was usually recovered on the 6-day blind subculture) or the TGC broth used in other body fluid cultures. The lack of contamination in uninoculated media, and the lack of any positive correlation with patient locations, indicated that these media were most likely being contaminated in the laboratory.
While there were no positive correlations with patient locations, the absence of contaminated pediatric blood cultures was noted. Pediatric specimens were inoculated through the rubber septum of the SP broth via a needle and syringe; adult specimens, by contrast, were first centrifuged, and then the sediment was inoculated with a pipette into the SP broth after the metal cap was removed. This procedure came under suspicion when a contaminated pediatric blood culture appeared, and investigation showed that the SP bottle had, contrary to policy, been uncapped prior to inoculation.
The initial environmental cultures of the primary work areas performed during this period failed to recover the contaminant organism. The reason for this may have been due to the use of dry swabs rather than premoistened swabs in our culture technique. Nonetheless, a general laboratory cleanup was performed, and there was increased awareness among laboratory personnel of the need for strict adherence to aseptic technique during culture inoculation.
(ii) Interim investigative period. During the period of late March to mid-April, the number of contaminated cultures declined. Since no contaminant source had been found, this decline was attributed to the greater awareness and resulting greater attention to aseptic technique among laboratory personnel.
A more extensive analysis of the compiled contaminated culture data showed that over half of the contaminated blood cultures were received within an hour of 8:00 a.m., normal opening time for the laboratory. All but two of the contaminated blood cultures not received during this time period were inoculated on the weekends. No such pattern existed for the receipt time of other contaminated body fluids.
This finding led to an examination of laboratory materials and work flow. It was discovered that the high volume of blood cultures during the 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. period required the use of a secondary work area, which had not been cultured during the initial outbreak. This secondary work area contained a boiling water bath in which TGC broths, used for other body fluids, were placed to remove dissolved oxygen. Cultures of the work surfaces and equipment in this area demonstrated the suspect Bacillus sp.; however, the organism was not found in the boiling water bath.
After a general disinfection of this secondary work area, extensive environmental cultures were performed throughout the laboratory, and the contaminant organism was recovered in smaller numbers from other work areas not involved in the primary culture process. While the evidence appeared to point to this secondary work area, the exact mode of contamination was not yet fully understood.
(iii) Second outbreak. In late April, the contamination of five other body fluid cultures signalled the return of the problem. Environmental cultures were repeated in the secondary work area, from which the contaminant organism was again recovered. Significantly, the organism was recovered in large numbers from the boiling water bath itself. It was theorized that initial cultures of the bath had been performed too soon after the boiling process, when the organism numbers had been reduced, or that reseeding had not occurred.
The mode of contamination was now felt to be understood. The morning boiling of TGC broths (performed at various times during the weekend) was the source of the contaminant organism. Handling of the wet tubes and subsequent uncapping of this medium and the SP broths processed at this time were the mode of transmission.
New laboratory protocols were established for changing the water in the boiling water bath daily and for the sterilization of the bath itself. Media processed prior to the institution of these protocols were removed from the laboratory, although in mid-May it was discovered that ancillary laboratories had retained some of the contaminated media. After all involved media had been discarded, no further isolations of the characteristic Bacillus sp. occurred. However, continued dissatisfaction with the uncapping of the SP broth led to the adoption of a protocol calling for the direct syringe inoculation of a portion of all blood samples prior to centrifugation.
DISCUSSION
Our previous experience with recurring culture contamination included a case of contaminated penicillinase and a commercial mycobacterial medium supplement contaminated during manufacture. Contaminant sources reported by others include contaminated disinfectants (4, 8) , contaminated collection tubes (2, 8) , and, recently, contaminated rubber gloves (12) . The complexity of the problem observed with the Bacillus sp. in the current situation was a significantly greater challenge than our previous cases because of both the low frequency of contamination and the 6-day delay in its recognition. Indeed, our investigation led us to the conclusion that there was a preexisting contamination problem of even lower frequency of an ampicillin-sensitive Bacillus sp. that went unrecognized until the higher-frequency resistant Bacillus sp. focused attention on the problem. This is consistent with pseudoepidemics that can often "smolder" at low levels for long periods of time without being recognized (6) .
The most important factor in recognizing pseudoepidemics is the ability to track a baseline recovery rate for all organisms (6) . In many laboratories, such baseline rates may exist only as impressions in the minds of technologists. While very valuable and, as in our case, much faster than once-a-month statistical control charts (Fig. 1 A difficult problem is distinguishing between the inevitable contamination during collection of the specimen and sporadic contamination during culture processing. For blood cultures, which are an effective measure of overall laboratory technique, it is generally recognized that phlebotomy contamination rates run from 3 to 5% (9). Contamination rates above this level are cause for investigation. When contamination is suspected, the clinical microbiologist has two goals: first, halting the contamination by whatever means, and second, tracking and eliminating the point source. These goals can be conflicting when, in the interest of expediency, global changes in procedure are made before any specific source is found. Thus, as in the case of the Bacillus outbreak, the disappearance or abatement of the pseudoepidemic may not be attributable to any one change, and the underlying source of the pseudoepidemic may remain hidden and cause problems at a later date. For this reason, it is important to follow a systematic investigation through to its conclusion regardless of the apparent spontaneous or unexplained resolution of the problem.
As in all systematic approaches to problem solving, steps may be performed concurrently or out of order. In wellunderstood cases, steps may be entirely omitted. However, it is important to stress that unless all elements of a systematic investigation have been performed, either formally or informally, the potential exists for the incomplete or incorrect solution of the problem. Such a systematic approach would include the following steps.
(i) Gathering data. A complete list of contaminated cultures should be made, listing all external laboratory data (e.g., hospital location, patient service, and phlebotomist) and internal laboratory data (time of processing, technologists involved in processing, and medium lot numbers). Contaminants should be identified not only by species but by their antibiograms or biotypes.
(ii) Determining commonalities. Static patterns involving labeled factors such as medium lot or patient location will be most easily discerned. Dynamic patterns involving material or personnel flow will require more detailed study and may involve changes in laboratory procedure (such as initialling culture media upon inoculation). Formal statistical analysis, while the most complete method, often requires a considerable amount of time for gathering uncollated baseline data. While such data may be important in retrospective documentation, for the laboratorian intent on solving a contamination problem, time is better spent investigating "obvious" commonalities. An important aspect of this phase of the investigation is the direct observation of procedures involved in the problem, particularly if the investigator does not routinely perform such procedures. Quite often this will lead to the discovery of variances from standard protocols. In addition, volume overflow and backup procedures, which may not be listed in official protocols, should be included in the investigation.
(iii) Evaluating commonalities and their exceptions. Commonalities, combined with a knowledge of the entire culture process, are the primary tool of any investigation of pseudoepidemics. For (v) Changing or enforcing existing procedures where necessary. As already noted, generic changes or simply raised consciousness due to recognition of the problem may in and of themselves solve the problem (usually by affecting the mode of transmission) before the formal investigation even begins. The delays inherent in recognition of reduced contamination require that each corrective step be documented by date and/or medium lot. Without this documentation, no clear conclusions can be drawn about the effectiveness of new corrective procedures. Broad generic solutions should also be considered even when a specific source and transmission route has been found. While specific solutions are to be included, a contamination problem should always spur a reexamination of the depth of quality control and procedural standards throughout the laboratory. In the case presented, for example, although the other water baths throughout the laboratory were not thought to be directly involved with the problem, it was considered prudent to establish routine cleaning schedules.
(vi) Monitoring subsequent contamination rates. While reduction of the contamination rate is the laboratory's main goal, it should be recognized that a return to baseline rates in the absence of a complete understanding of the problem cannot be considered a success. This is an especially common predicament in cases where the source of contamination is eliminated before the contamination makes itself evident in the culture. In such cases, a schedule of environmental and medium sterility checks should be established in an attempt to document the source should it recur.
While every microbiology laboratory suffers from a contamination problem at some time, the use of these guidelines should aid in the rapid resolution of the contamination and prevent subsequent recurrences.
